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INTENTION TO DRIVE NOT 
NECESSARY FOR  
CARE & CONTROL 
R. v. Don Vann, 2002 SKQB 89 
 
In the middle of winter a police 
o
a
s
s
r
T
w
h
v
T
c
e
t
a
c
 
I
o
C
f
r
i
I
n
u
h
v
i
e
t
 
 
1
o
R
 
vehicle in motion so that it could become dangerous”.  
In this case, the Court held, at para. 16: 
 
The [accused] had been behind the wheel for 20 seconds. 
The engine had been started, the heater was on and the 
[accused] was revving the engine. He clearly performed 
acts involving the use of the car, its fittings or 
equipment, whereby the vehicle may unintentionally be 
V
Mofficer observed the accused 
walking from a bar, where he had 
been drinking all day, and go 
between a car and truck.  The 
fficer heard a vehicle start, noticed exhaust fumes, 
nd pulled in behind to find the accused, wearing only a 
hort sleeved t-shirt, in the driver’s seat without his 
eatbelt on.  The vehicle was running, the engine 
evving, the lights were off, but the heater was on.  
he accused testified that he had made arrangements 
ith another person to drive him home and had entered 
is vehicle to wait for the ride and had started the 
ehicle only to stay warm; he had no intention to drive. 
he accused nonetheless was convicted of care and 
ontrol of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in 
xcess of 80mg%.  The accused appealed his conviction 
o the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench arguing, 
mong other grounds, that the judge failed to properly 
onsider his intent.  
n proving care and control, the Crown can rely either 
n the presumption found in s.258(1)(a) of the Criminal 
ode or by proving actual care and control. In the 
ormer, the intent of the accused is important in 
ebutting the presumption but for the latter, it is 
rrelevant whether the person had the intent to drive1. 
n this case, McIntyre J. noted that the accused had 
ot been convicted on the basis of the presumption but 
pon Crown having proven actual care and control which 
as been defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. 
. Toews [1985] 2 S.C.R. 119 as including “acts which 
nvolve some use of the car or its fittings and 
quipment, or some course of conduct associated with 
he vehicle which would involve a risk of putting the 
                                                
 The Court noted that there are some circumstances where an intent not to drive 
r abandoning the intent to drive may be relevant to actual care and control (citing 
. v. Sherbrook (1998) 164 Sask. R. 183 (Q.B.)) but did not apply to the case at bar.  
set in motion. All it required was to put the vehicle in 
reverse. 
 
It was not necessary to determine whether the 
accused had the intent to drive or simply to keep warm. 
Care and control had been satisfied and the appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca 
 
SEARCH OF GLOVE BOX 
FOLLOWING IMPAIRED ARREST 
REASONABLE 
R. v. Neigum, 2002 SKPC 26 
 
After responding to a call reporting 
olume 2 Issue 5 
ay 2002 a suspected impaired driver, a police 
officer found the accused alone, 
seat belted in, and sleeping in the 
driver’s seat of a truck parked 
slanted on the shoulder of a road with its engine 
running. The officer arrested the accused for care and 
control while impaired, read him his right to counsel, 
and told him he could call a lawyer at the police station. 
While waiting for back up and a tow truck, the officer 
searched the accused’s vehicle and found a pop bottle 
containing an alcoholic beverage under the seat. The 
officer also opened the glove box looking for alcohol 
and found a plastic bag in plain view while detecting an 
odour of marihuana. Inside the bag, the officer found a 
zip lock bag containing marihuana.  
 
At the police station, the officer asked the accused 
whether he would like to call a lawyer; he responded 
“No. I’ll call later”. The officer then showed the 
accused the marihuana he had found and stated, 
“You’re charged with impaired driving and there is this 
 other thing too that you have to know I found in the 
truck”. While in the breathalyser room the officer told 
the accused that if he changed his mind about the 
lawyer he would have an opportunity to talk to one. At 
this time the accused asked about the marihuana and 
the officer responded that as soon as the tests were 
done they would talk about it. Following the tests, the 
officer interviewed the accused about the marihuana 
without any further mention of contacting a lawyer. 
The accused suggested that his s.10(b) Charter right 
to counsel was violated and the warrantless search of 
the glove box breached his s.8 Charter right.  
 
s. 10 (b) Charter 
 
While the accused failed to establish a violation of his 
right to counsel respecting the impaired charge (he was 
advised or reminded of his right 3 times - at the scene, 
on arrival at the office, and in the breathalyser room), 
his waiver respecting the marihuana charge was “not so 
clear”: 
 
[The accused’s] response to [the officer], when invited to 
let them know should he change his mind about contacting 
a lawyer, should have alerted [the officer] that the 
accused may wish to speak to a lawyer before being 
questioned with respect to the marihuana charge. The 
accused asked about the marihuana in response to and in 
the context of [the officer’s] mention of phoning a 
lawyer. [The officer’s] response to [the accused] implied 
that he need not be concerned about that charge just 
then, that they would first finish dealing with the matter 
at hand, being the breath tests. 
 
Meekma J. concluded “there was no clear waiver by the 
accused of his right to counsel prior to being 
questioned with respect to the drug charge”. His right 
to counsel was thus violated.  
 
s. 8 Charter 
 
With respect to the warrantless search and the finding 
of the marihuana, the Court held “the search of the 
glove compartment…for alcohol was reasonable and 
justified incidental to [the accused’s] arrest for care 
and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by 
alcohol”.  
 
As a result, the evidence concerning both the breath 
samples and drug exhibits was admissible while the 
statements regarding the marihuana were excluded.  
 
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca 
REQUEST FOR VIDEO LINK OF 
OFFICER’S TESTIMINOY 
DISMISSED 
R. v. Raj, 2002 BCSC 193 
 
The Crown made an application that 
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case be allowed to testify via video 
link. The RCMP officer was 
transferred from British Columbia to 
a 3-person island detachment off the coast of New 
Brunswick. The Crown submitted that the officer’s 
absence in the remote detachment would leave the 
island under policed and would involve overtime pay and 
approximately $4000 in travel expenses. The accused 
argued that the most significant matter at trial was the 
search of the vehicle, which uncovered the 3 kilograms 
of marihuana at a traffic roadblock, and the credibility 
and reliability of the officer’s evidence was at issue. In 
this vein, the video link made it difficult to observe the 
body language and facial expressions of the witness 
officer. In dismissing the Crown’s application, the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia concluded “there is a 
reasonable likelihood that taking [the] evidence by video 
link would impede or impact negatively on the ability of 
the defence counsel to cross-examine the [officer]” and 
“may well compromise the accused’s right to make full 
answer and defence”. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
IMPAIRED REASONABLE 
GROUNDS: LACK OF WITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION NOT 
RELEVANT 
R. v. Mesenchuck, 2002 BCSC 448 
 
A police officer responded to a non-
injury motor vehicle accident at a 
rural intersection. A witness to the 
accident told the officer that the 
male driver was walking down the road. The officer, 
who could see a lone person about 300 yards away,  
went after and came within about 100 yards when the 
person looked over his shoulder and jumped into tall 
grass. The officer called out – threatening to bring a 
police dog – and about 10 minutes later the accused was 
located. The officer detected a strong smell of “beer 
2
 or alcohol” on the accused’s breath, noted slurred 
speech, and observed that the accused was unsteady on 
his feet. After forming his opinion the accused was 
impaired, the officer arrested and transported him to 
the police office. The accused was presented to a 
qualified breathalyzer technician but failed to provide 
samples. Although the accused was acquitted of care 
and control while impaired because none of the 
witnesses were able to identify him at trial as the 
driver, he was nonetheless convicted of failing to 
provide a breath sample.  
 
 
The accused appealed his conviction to the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia arguing, among other 
grounds, that the officer did not possess adequate 
reasonable and probable grounds to demand breath 
samples. The accused suggested that because the 
witnesses failed to identify the accused as the driver 
of the vehicle in question, the officer’s demand was 
improper. In assessing whether a proper demand was 
made by the police officer, the Court must direct 
itself to the belief of the officer at the time of the 
demand and not on the inability of witnesses to 
identify the accused. Reasonable and probable grounds 
to demand a breath sample requires a subjective belief  
(the officer’s mind) based on objective criteria. In this 
case, the objective criteria grounding the officer’s 
belief that the accused was the driver was summarized 
as follows: 
 
• “[a witness] pointed out a male walking 
approximately three hundred yards down the road 
from the intersection. He was the only person 
walking on the road; 
• “[the officer] traveled approximately two hundred 
yards down the road when he saw the man look 
over his shoulder and dive into the underbrush of 
the ditch area; 
• “[the officer] searched this area for 
approximately ten minutes and then found [the 
accused] lying down at the bottom of an 
approximately five foot deep ditch in about three 
inches of water; 
• “when helping [the accused] from the ditch, [the 
officer] observed him to be wet, unsteady on his 
feet, slurring his speech and exhibiting a strong 
smell of alcohol. 
 
In dismissing the accused’s appeal, McKinnon J. found 
the “totality of the evidence relating to [the officer’s] 
involvement” allowed the trial judge to reasonably 
conclude the officer had the requisite grounds to make 
the demand.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
WARRANTLESS IN-HOME 
ARRESTS: LOOKING FORWARD 
FROM FEENEY 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
The legal authority to arrest a person 
does not by itself justify an entry into 
a dwelling house to effect the arrest. 
There is a recognized distinction 
between the police power to arrest and 
the police power to enter to carry out 
the arrest and they are analytically 
distinct. The former deals with the 
power to make the arrest while the 
latter deals with the power to enter to 
carry it out. Since the decision in R. v. 
Feeney [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, entry to effect an arrest in 
a dwelling house is generally prohibited unless the 
police are in fresh pursuit or in cases of exigent 
circumstances. To comport with Charter values, entry 
is permissible when the interests of law enforcement 
outweigh the privacy interest of the individual in the 
home. This article will examine some of the recent 
cases from provincial appellate courts concerning 
arrests in private residences. 
 
In R. v. Duong and Tran 2002 BCCA 43, the most 
recent of these cases, police officers canvassed a 
neighbourhood for possible witnesses after responding 
to a home invasion. One of the officers approached the 
front door of a residence and knocked. As a male 
opened the door, the officer felt a rush of warm, 
humid air carrying the odour of both burning and 
growing marihuana. As the officer questioned the male 
about the home invasion he observed a female standing 
inside the house. The officer described the male at the 
door as “fidgety”, rocking on his heels, looking over his 
shoulder, avoiding eye contact, and attempting to pull 
the door closed behind him. The officer called for 
backup and after a second officer arrived, the male 
and female were arrested inside the residence for 
growing marihuana. The officers then checked the 
residence to satisfy themselves there were no other 
persons present. While inside, police made several 
observations including a padlocked basement door, fans 
humming in the basement, and a locked rear basement 
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 door. A search warrant was obtained and executed 
resulting in the seizure of a commercial marihuana grow 
operation from the basement and other evidence 
linking the arrested occupants to the premises. 
Following conviction at trial, the accused appealed 
arguing the police violated their right under the 
Charter to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure and that the evidence should be excluded 
because the arrest, entry, and walk through following 
the arrest were unlawful. 
 
Section 529.1 of the Criminal Code, Parliament’s 
response to the Feeney decision, allows the police to 
enter a residence without a warrant to arrest in 
exigent circumstances if the police have the power to 
arrest under s.495 and reasonable grounds to believe 
the person is within the residence. Exigent 
circumstances are defined in the Code as including 
circumstances where the officer believes on 
reasonable grounds that entry is necessary to prevent 
the imminent loss or destruction of evidence relating 
to an indictable offence. In this case, the officer had 
both reasonable grounds to arrest and reasonable 
grounds the person was present. Likewise, the standard 
for assessing the existence of exigent circumstances is 
reasonable grounds. In other words, the officer must 
believe exigent circumstances exist and that belief 
must be supported objectively. The trial judge 
concluded exigent circumstances existed after 
accepting the officer’s testimony that: 
 
• if he left to get a warrant the accused could 
escape and he would subsequently be unable to 
identify him; 
• the accused and anyone else inside could destroy 
evidence; 
• because of an officer shortage that evening he 
would have difficulty obtaining additional officers  
to watch the house; and  
• he was dealing with an ‘active’ crime rather than 
one that could be dealt with later. 
 
The accused argued that a commercial marihuana grow 
operation could not be dismantled and destroyed in the 
hour it would have taken the officer to obtain the 
warrant, unlike a quantity of cocaine which could easily 
be destroyed. Although the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal agreed that the operation could not be 
completely destroyed, other evidence linking the 
accused to the operation, such as documents and 
fingerprints on equipment, could be made unavailable 
had the accused been left inside the home for that 
hour. The Court refused to interfere with the trial 
judge’s conclusion that exigent circumstances existed. 
 
The Court also examined whether the entry of the 
premises and the initial search were lawful as an 
incident to arrest at common law. For a search to be 
incident to arrest, the following threefold test must be 
satisfied: 
 
1. the arrest must be lawful 
2. the search must be for a valid investigatory 
objective  
3. the search must be conducted in a reasonable 
manner 
 
Because the arrest was lawful, the officer’s “entry of 
the premises without a warrant to ensure its security 
and to preserve evidence was a lawful incident of that 
arrest and was not carried out in an unreasonable 
manner”. The entry and search were therefore lawful 
at common law as well as under statute.  
 
In R. v. Grothiem, 2001 SKCA 116, a police officer was 
investigating a complaint that a vehicle had struck a 
tree. The officer responded and found a damaged 
evergreen, a trail of fluid, and a long black skid mark 
leading to a nearby driveway where a truck with 
extensive front-end damage was parked. The officer 
knocked on the door of the house to ask about the 
accident when someone yelled, “come in”. The officer 
entered and found three men with whom he was 
familiar; one of them was injured. The accused entered 
the room, was unsteady on his feet, and appeared 
intoxicated. When he was about to explain what 
happened the officer asked who was driving the 
vehicle. The accused stated he had been driving and 
accidentally ran into the tree while turning into the 
driveway. The officer concluded the accused was 
impaired and placed his hand on the accused’s arm and 
suggested the two step outside or go to the police car 
to discuss the matter. The accused brushed the 
officer’s hand aside and braced himself against the 
door jam. The officer grabbed the accused and pulled 
him through the doorway, hastily advising him he was 
under arrest. At the station, the accused subsequently 
provided breath samples over the legal limit. 
 
At trial, the judge found both the presence of the 
officer in the home and the arrest lawful. On appeal, 
the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench opined that 
although the officer had been lawfully in the accused’s 
home, the arrest was inappropriate because an in-home 
arrest absent exigent circumstances is a grave matter. 
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 Because the officer “should have left the premises and 
attempted to obtain an arrest warrant”, the arrest was 
unjustified and the results of the breath tests were 
excluded and the conviction was set aside. On further 
appeal, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal found the 
officer was lawfully present in the home at the time of 
arrest. He was invited in and had not been told to leave. 
Since the officer had reasonable grounds, the arrest 
for impaired driving causing bodily harm was lawful. 
The conviction was restored.  
 
In R. v. Castro, Stinchcombe, & Ferretti, 2001 BCCA 
507, police intercepted telephone calls between the 
three accused suggesting they were organizing a drug 
deal at a hotel. Police set up surveillance on the hotel 
and observed two men who appeared to be keeping 
watch outside two rooms (unit 309 and 310) registered 
to the accused Stinchcombe. At 11:30 pm the accused 
Castro and Ferretti, carrying a brown bag, arrived and 
entered room 309. About one hour later, Castro and 
Ferretti left the room without the brown bag and were 
arrested. Neither drugs nor large amounts of money 
were found on them. At 2:40 am another man, 
identified as Mostell, left the hotel room and was 
followed by police, but they subsequently lost 
surveillance of his vehicle. It was not known whether 
he left with any drugs or money. Although they did not 
have a warrant, police decided to enter the two hotel 
rooms and arrest the occupants fearing they may have 
been alerted by Mostell of the police presence and 
were either destroying the evidence or barricading 
themselves in the rooms. In room 309 police found two 
people and Stinchcombe asleep in room 310. Police 
obtained a search warrant and under the mattress in 
room 310 police found a kilogram of cocaine in a duct-
taped package. Stinchcombe was arrested and the 
other two men provided evidence implicating the three 
accused. 
 
Although the British Columbia Court of Appeal ordered 
a new trial on a disclosure issue, the Court rejected 
Stinchcombe’s ground of appeal that the drugs seized 
in the search of the two adjoining hotel rooms should 
be excluded because the initial entry to the rooms was 
made without warrant. The Court found “the entry was 
necessary to preserve evidence in exigent 
circumstances and that the police action did not 
exceed the requirements of the situation as no search 
occurred until a warrant was issued. The drugs were 
found as a result of a search authorized by a warrant. 
There was a real risk that Mostell, who eluded the 
police, could have tipped off those in the rooms” 
In R. v. Hofung (2001) Docket:C31904 (OntCA), an 
undercover police officer purchased heroin several 
times from a suspect. During a culminating drug deal 
ending the 4-month undercover drug investigation, police 
arrested one suspect in a car outside an apartment and a 
second suspect in the lobby of the same apartment 
building after he had exited a unit believed to be the 
source of the drugs. The officers also believed that a 
quantity of drugs remained inside this unit along with 
the person who supplied the drugs to the two arrested 
suspects. Police forced entry into the apartment without 
a warrant and arrested the accused. After several 
firearms were observed in a bedroom cabinet, police 
secured the apartment and obtained a search warrant to 
seize the weapons. Police subsequently located two 
loaded handguns under a couch in the living room. In 
assuming without deciding that the warrantless police 
entry and search of the apartment was a s.8 Charter 
breach, the Ontario Court of Appeal admitted the 
evidence because the police had “well-founded” concerns 
“about weapons inside the apartment” in light of the 
unfolding events that day. 
 
In R. v. Adams (2001) Docket:C34243 (OntCA), police 
attended a rooming house and purportedly obtained the 
consent of the superintendent of the building to enter 
a shared laundry room where the accused was 
ultimately arrested. A subsequent search of the 
accused resulted in the discovery of a controlled drug 
that led to the charges before the Court. The accused 
challenged the entry of the police into the laundry 
room to make the arrest. If the entry to arrest was 
unlawful, the resultant search incidental to the arrest 
would be unreasonable as the arrest formed the 
foundation for the search. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal reasoned that the general prohibition against 
warrantless entry into a dwelling to affect an arrest is 
not restricted to a suspect’s dwelling and applies 
equally to the dwelling of a third party. Furthermore, 
because the police tricked the superintendent by 
stating their purpose in entering was to investigate a 
noise complaint when their real purpose was to arrest 
the accused, consent was not properly informed. Thus, 
the entry and search were unreasonable and the 
evidence was excluded. 
 
In R. v. Schulz 2001 BCCA 601, police attended the 
accused’s residence to communicate information to him 
at the request of an outside agency. After knocking, a 
voice from within the premises stated “come-in” and 
the officer opened the door and observed the accused 
seated at the table. The accused immediately got up 
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 and closed the door behind the officer. The officer 
detected the odour of burning marihuana from within 
the residence, advised the accused of this, and that 
the residence would be searched as a result. The 
officer arrested the accused for possession of a 
controlled substance and the officer called for back-
up. The back-up officer entered the residence to 
“ensure that no other persons were present in the 
premises and to preserve any evidence”. A warrant was 
subsequently obtained and incriminating evidence 
located which formed the basis for a conviction. The 
accused appealed arguing, among other grounds, the 
arrest was unlawful because there were insufficient 
grounds upon which to base the arrest, the incidental 
search was thus unreasonable, and the evidence should 
have been excluded. The Court found the officer had 
sufficient grounds to arrest and that the initial search 
of the residence was incidental thereto. The appeal 
was dismissed. 
 
In Townsend v. Sault Ste. Marie Police Service (2002) 
Docket:C36850 (OntCA), the plaintiff appealed the 
dismissal of his lawsuit in which he claimed in part, that 
the police were trespassing at the time they arrested 
him in his dwelling. In dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal, 
the Ontario top court found the police had authorization 
to enter the home under a search warrant and the 
arrest was lawful.  
 
In R. v. Haglof 2000 BCCA 604, police attended a 
property damage hit and run accident where the driver 
had fled the scene. After obtaining address information 
on the registered owner of a plate number provided by a 
witness, police attended the owner's residence 15 
minutes after the accident. Police also received 
information from a neighbour that she observed the 
accused’s vehicle race down the lane and disappear out 
of sight. The police officer noted the accused’s 
residence was located at a dead end and there was 
nowhere else for the vehicle to go other than the 
garage. Upon knocking at the door police observed the 
movement of window blinds from someone peeking out. 
After 25 minutes on scene (a total of 40 minutes after 
the offence) police entered the residence through a 
rear sliding door. The accused was located in the 
residence and arrested for hit and run under the 
provincial Motor Vehicle Act. During a sweep of the 
residence to ensure no one else was present, injured or 
hiding, and to secure the home, police located a 
marihuana operation in the basement. The Court found 
the chain of events sufficiently proximate amounting to 
fresh pursuit, thus the entry lawful. The evidence 
obtained following police entry was untainted and could 
properly support a search warrant the police 
subsequently applied for and were granted. 
 
More About Fresh Pursuit 
 
A person cannot defeat a lawful 
arrest that has been set in 
motion by seeking refuge in a 
private premise. In the words of 
C.J. Lamer in R. v. Macooh 
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 802 (S.C.C.): 
 
[I]t would be unacceptable for 
police officers who were about to make a completely lawful 
arrest to be prevented from doing so merely because the 
offender had taken refuge in his home or that of a third 
party. 
 
Hot or fresh pursuit has been defined as a continuous 
pursuit, conducted with reasonable diligence, so that the 
commission of the offence, pursuit, and capture may be 
considered as forming part of a single transaction. Fresh 
pursuit does not require continuous and uninterrupted 
visual contact with the fleeing suspect. For example, a 
suspect rounding a corner and briefly lost from sight will 
not defeat this doctrine. Likewise, police may pursue a 
person fleeing into a dwelling even if the police do not 
observe the person enter. Similarly, a pursuit that ends 
almost as soon as it begins will still amount to hot 
pursuit, such as a person fleeing from a driveway into a 
home. 
 
It is not necessary that the offence be a criminal 
offence for which the person is being pursued. Where 
the police have the power to arrest for a provincial 
offence, entry into a dwelling is also justified2. 
Undoubtedly, fresh pursuit occurs when the police are 
lawfully in a position to effect an arrest and the suspect 
takes flight from the officer’s presence; evasion is 
contemporaneous with the arrest attempt. Although the 
police need not witness the initial crime, they do require 
the necessary power of arrest prior to flight. 
 
Cases will also arise where the officer arrives on the 
scene of an offence and the suspect has already fled 
prior to police arrival. While at the scene the police 
engage in further investigation that provide information 
causing police to “shadow”, or "track", the suspect to a 
dwelling. In such a case the police neither observed the 
offence nor the suspect's entry into the dwelling, nor 
was an arrest yet attempted or set in motion. The test 
                                                 
2 R. v. Macooh [1993] 2 S.C.R. 802 (S.C.C.) 
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 is whether the events linking the offence to the capture 
are sufficiently proximate to be considered as forming 
part of a single transaction3; there must be “real 
continuity between the commission of the offence and 
the pursuit undertaken by police”4. There is no fixed 
formula for when a fresh pursuit becomes stale and each 
circumstance will need to be taken in context and turn 
on the facts of the individual case. For instance, entry 
following the application of a police tracking dog shortly 
after the commission of an offence may amount to fresh 
pursuit. 
 
Summary 
 
In short, the following principles can be extracted 
from the above cases: 
 
• the legality or illegality of police entry is 
determined at the moment of entry (eg. entry 
based on exigent circumstances) and does not 
change from the result (eg. evidence was not being 
destroyed); 
• non-consentual entry into a dwelling house to 
arrest is generally prohibited unless law 
enforcement’s interest outweighs the individual’s 
right to privacy; 
• compelling law enforcement interest favouring 
warrantless entry includes fresh pursuit and 
exigent circumstances; 
• exigent circumstances are to be considered from 
the perspective of the officer based on reasonable 
grounds (subjective/objective analysis);  
• entries can be justified under both statute 
(Parliament’s response to Feeney) or at common law 
incident to arrest. In either case the police must 
face exigencies of the moment. Where the 
exigencies involve preservation of evidence the 
standard is reasonable grounds. Where exigencies 
involve safety concerns the standard is lower, but 
must amount to a reasonable suspicion5.  
• the belief evidence will be destroyed does not 
require that all the evidence is at risk. Simply 
because the evidence could not be lost in its 
entirety without immediate police action does not 
necessarily establish the absence of exigent 
circumstances; and 
• an arrest following consent to enter is lawful 
provided the consent was properly informed. 
 
                                                 
3 R. v. Hagloff 2000 BCCA 604 
4 R. v. Macooh [1993] 2 S.C.R. 802 (S.C.C.) 
5 See s.529.3(2) Criminal Code. 
CLASS 86 GRADUATES 
 
The Police Academy is pleased to 
announce the successful graduation of 
recruit Class 86 as qualified municipal 
constables on May 3, 2002. 
 
ABBOTSFORD 
Cst. Bjorn Grimsmo 
Cst. Jody Thomas 
 
DELTA  
Cst. Derek Defrane 
Cst. Brent Morson 
Cst. Michael White 
 
NEW WESTMINSTER 
Cst. Patrick Dyck 
 
SAANICH 
Cst. Brent Kelleher 
Cst. Andrew Stuart 
Cst. Robert Warren 
 
VICTORIA 
Cst. Joan Elliott 
VANCOUVER 
Cst. Anja Bergler 
Cst. Kyle Davies 
Cst. Besnick Dobrecki 
Cst. Gregory Fodor 
Cst. Jennifer Giese 
Cst. Stephen Haras 
Cst. Nancy Jolin 
Cst. Bryan McKeddie 
Cst. Douglas Woollacott 
 
WEST VANCOUVER 
Cst. Bruno Accili 
Cst. Michael Bruce 
Cst. Jarrett Chow 
Cst. Ian Hynes 
Cst. Jodi Ramsay 
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Congratulations to Cst. Robert Warren 7
(Saanich), who was the recipient of the 
British Columbia Association of Chiefs of 
Police Shield of Merit for best all 
around recruit performance in basic 
training. Cst. Stephen Haras (Vancouver) 
received the Abbotsford Police Association Oliver 
Thomson Trophy for outstanding physical fitness. Cst. 
Patrick Dyck (New Westminster) was the recipient of 
the Vancouver Police Union Excellence in Academics 
award for best academic test results in all disciplines. 
Cst. Robert Warren (Saanich) received the British 
Columbia Federation of Police Officers Valedictorian 
award for being selected by his peers to represent his 
class at the graduation ceremony. Cst. Jody Thomas 
(Abbotsford) was the recipient of the Abbotsford Police 
Recruit Marksmanship award for highest qualification 
score during Block 3 training (48/50). Although not 
formally recognized at the graduation ceremony, Cst. 
Brent Morson (Delta) received the award for the 
fastest Police Officer’s Physical Abilities Test. 
 TWO YEAR SENTENCE FOR 
PROBATION VIOLATION NOT 
UNFIT 
R. v. Swanson, 2002 BCCA 243 
 
An accused who received a sentence 
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Section 91(2) of the Criminal Code prohibits the 
possession of a prohibited weapon, including "the 
device commonly known as a "Morning Star" and any 
similar device consisting of a ball of metal or other 
heavy material, studded with spikes and connected to a 
handle by a length of chain, rope or other flexible 
material". In this case, the accused argued that 
because the object seized by police did not have 
V
Mof two years less a day for 
breaching his probation has had his 
sentence appeal dismissed by the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal. 
he accused was convicted of one count of breach of 
robation when he attended his 85-year-old mother’s 
ome without the permission of his probation officer.  
olice were called and found the accused hiding in the 
athroom with the lights off. This was the accused’s 
hirteenth conviction for breaching a court order in 
ust over a year, which began when police laid a s. 810 
riminal Code information (peace bond) against the 
ccused forbidding him from returning to his mother’s 
ome. In dismissing the accused’s argument that his 
entence was “unfit”, Ryan J.A. for a unanimous Court 
tated: 
I do not see any point in placing [the accused] on further 
probation orders which he has every intention to breach. 
Every opportunity has been extended to [him], every 
resource available has been tapped in an attempt to help 
him. Nothing has worked in the past, nothing but a change 
in attitude will help him in the future. 
 
omplete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
HOME-MADE ‘MORNING STAR’ 
A PROHIBITED WEAPON 
R. v. Sampson,  
[2002] O.J. No. 1339 (Ont.C.J.) 
 
A police officer, directing traffic in an 
"spikes", if fell outside the definition and the defence 
was therefore entitled to a directed verdict of 
acquittal. The Crown argued that it was open to the 
Court to find that the sides and edges of the nuts and 
bolts were spikes. In holding that each nut "has 
vertices which are pointed", the Court concluded that 
this satisfied the requirement of "studded with spikes" 
and that the object seized properly fell within the 
definition of the "Morning Star" prohibited weapon. 
 
ENTRY FOLLOWING 9-1-1 CALL 
LAWFUL: LAWSUIT DISMISSED 
Skinty v. Bell, 
(2002) A.J. No. 454 (Alta.Q.B.) 
 
Following a dispute with his 
basement tenant, the intoxicated 
plaintiff made numerous calls to the 
police complaint line, but would hang 
up after he was asked questions that 
digressed from the point he was trying to make. Being 
annoyed by the questions he was asked and his lack of 
progress with police, the accused called 9-1-1, said 
nothing, and left the receiver off the hook. Constables 
Bell and Korek responded to the call and arrived 3-
minutes after a second 9-1-1 call was received from the 
residence. Again nothing was said.  Cst. Bell approached 
the front door while Cst. Korek went toward the side 
of the house. The events that transpired were 
summarized by the Court of Queen's Bench justice as 
follows: area being evacuated due to an 
anthrax scare, stopped the accused 
who was driving a taxi cab and 
earched his car after he would not move it on the 
fficer’s request. In an open briefcase on the front 
eat, the officer observed what he believed was a 
ome-made "morning star". The officer described the 
bject as a small ball, with nuts and bolts welded to it, 
ttached to a tubular piece of metal by a chain. 
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When the Plaintiff opened the door he simply told Bell to 
"fuck off". Bell asked him if anyone else had called 911 
and the response was, once again, "fuck off'. Neither 
officer had experienced this before so Bell used his left 
arm and simply pushed the Plaintiff aside and walked into 
the house followed by Korek. He noted another male [the 
Plaintiff's 85 year old intoxicated uncle - Tvidochib] in 
the kitchen area and went directly there. Korek did not 
touch the Plaintiff who remained at the front door. Korek 
asked him to stay where he was and again Korek was told, 
"fuck off". The Plaintiff started walking about the living 
room area which was immediately adjacent to the front 
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 door and on approaching Korek, Korek put his hand up and 
told the Plaintiff to stay where he was. They touched but 
that is all. Korek then moved more toward the kitchen 
and hallway and positioned himself where he had a better 
view of the main floor area. At this time the Plaintiff was 
walking around the living room area muttering to himself. 
Korek could not understand his behaviour, noting that the 
Plaintiff was becoming more and more agitated. Bell, in 
the meantime, had gone into the kitchen area where he 
noted liquor and beer bottles on the table and concluded 
that Tvidochib was intoxicated. He was mumbling and 
gave no answers to the questions posed.  
 
Bell then searched the bedroom and bathroom areas to 
see if there was any problem there and finding none, 
returned to the kitchen. At that point he tried to again 
speak to Tvidochib and while doing so noted that the 
Plaintiff was moving toward Korek in an aggressive 
fashion which I understood to mean that he had his 
hands clenched as fists. Bell was not sure that Korek 
noticed him coming so Bell moved quickly and by use of 
his hand against the Plaintiff's chest, pushed him 
backward. The Plaintiff fell on his seat and probably hit 
his head on the floor. We have no evidence as to what the 
floor covering was. Korek said that he noted the Plaintiff 
out of the corner of his eye coming toward him but that 
Bell intervened and pushed the Plaintiff. As Bell put it, 
the Plaintiff was ranting and using profane language 
throughout these events.  
 
The Plaintiff got up within about ten seconds and circled 
through the dining room area into the kitchen. This 
meant that he did not pass by Korek. By this point, Bell 
was in the kitchen, had picked up the telephone, and was 
about to put it to his ear when the Plaintiff, swearing, 
came at him, knocked the phone out of his hand and 
bumped him chest to chest. Bell pushed him away, 
possibly using his foot or his knee to do so. The Plaintiff 
again came at Bell with his fists raised, at which point 
Bell told the Plaintiff he was under arrest for 
obstruction and tried to put him in a headlock so as to 
control him. In doing so, his arm slipped and the buttons 
on his coat cut the bridge of the Plaintiff's nose. The 
Plaintiff has a very thick neck and it is not surprising 
that this occurred. Bell advised the Plaintiff that he was 
under arrest for obstruction and assault. At this point, 
Korek moved in and managed to apply handcuffs to the 
right wrist of the Plaintiff who resisted having them put 
on the left wrist. Korek is a relatively small person and no 
match for the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff continued uttering 
profanities. In any event, about this point in time, 
Winkworth [the plaintiff's basement tenant] who had 
heard a bump on the floor above him, came up from the 
basement and into the kitchen area. He noted what was 
transpiring and asked the police to let the Plaintiff go, 
advising that he would look after him. The police did so, 
after being satisfied that Winkworth was sober and 
capable of attending to the Plaintiff. ... [T]he handcuffs 
were taken off and the Plaintiff was released from 
arrest.  
 
The plaintiff brought an action against the police 
claiming damages for headaches, a cut nose, a cut left 
hand, a sore ankle, bruised chest, and an injured 
shoulder which he asserted resulted from unlawful  
police trespass, assault, and wrongful imprisonment.  
 
Trespass by Police 
 
In finding that the officers “had no choice but to 
enter the residence to investigate a potential 
emergency”, including searching the home after 
receiving unsatisfactory responses from the occupants, 
Murray J. stated: 
 
When a 911 call is made and there is no response, the 
police have every right to assume that the caller or 
indeed someone in the home is in distress and requires 
immediate assistance. Their duty to protect life is 
engaged and until they could ascertain who had made the 
call and why, they have the right to intrude upon the 
privacy of the person residing on the premises, as long as 
in doing so they act reasonably. When one considers the 
totality of the circumstances their entering the 
Plaintiff's premises and behaving as I have found they 
did, which included attempting to keep the Plaintiff 
under control while they made their investigation, was 
necessary and their actions reasonable. They would have 
been remiss had they acted otherwise.  
 
Assault by Police 
 
The Court examined the assault allegations as two 
separate incidents; the pushing of the plaintiff where 
he fell back into a seated position and likely hit his 
head and the headlock incident in the kitchen. With 
respect to the push, the Court concluded that Cst. Bell 
acted on reasonable grounds that the plaintiff was 
advancing on Cst. Korek and only as much force as was 
necessary was used to prevent the plaintiff from 
committing an offence against Cst. Korek, which would 
likely have caused “immediate and possibly serious 
injury”. In the kitchen, the circumstances of bumping 
Cst. Bell, knocking the phone from his hand, and coming 
back at the officer after the plaintiff had been pushed 
away amounted to obstruction, as well as an assault, 
which justified an arrest. Consequently, Cst. Bell was 
justified in using as much force as was necessary for 
that purpose: 
 
One must not lose sight of the fact that this was an 
emergent situation and it is very difficult to measure 
with nicety the amount of force which a police officer 
Volume 2 Issue 5 
May 2002 
9
 uses in such a situation. In my view, given the overall 
circumstances of this case and in particular the 
behaviour, condition, and size of the Plaintiff, the actions 
of both Bell and Korek were reasonable. It is also 
important to note that as soon as Winkworth arrived on 
the scene and the police officers were satisfied he was 
sober and could deal with the situation, they immediately 
removed the handcuffs from the Plaintiff and released 
him from arrest. Before leaving, Bell quite calmly 
attempted to obtain a commitment from the Plaintiff 
that he would not abuse the 911 facility, and left. The 
evidence does not support the contention that the police 
officers sought to harm the Plaintiff. What happened 
was a result of his own misbehaviour. 
 
Wrongful Imprisonment by Police 
 
For the same reasons, the allegation that the plaintiff 
was unlawfully confined and falsely arrested was 
“untenable”.  
 
The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim. 
 
CERTIFICATE OF ANALYSIS IS 
EVIDENCE OF IMPAIRMENT 
R. v. Eliuk, 2002 ABCA 85 
 
The accused was the driver of a 
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Reasonable Grounds 
 
The accused argued that the officer lacked reasonable 
grounds for making the breathalyser demand. The 
Court rejected this ground of appeal finding the 
officer’s grounds based partly on what he had been 
told by another officer (odour of alcohol, swaying 
slightly, and that there had been a serious accident) 
met the required standard. 
 
Right to Counsel 
 
The accused was placed in a telephone room with the 
door remaining open and was provided a list of Legal 
Aid lawyers where he proceeded to make 40 calls over 
a span of 45 minutes without successfully speaking to 
counsel. The accused provided a sample of breath after 
he was told it was time to blow, and continued to make 
further calls between breath samples. The accused 
suggested his rights were violated because the door to 
the telephone room was left open and he was denied a 
reasonable opportunity when he was told it was time to 
blow while he was trying to call a lawyer. In rejecting 
both these arguments, the Appeal Court upheld the 
trial judge’s conclusion that the accused’s rights were 
not violated. The accused was not aware that the door 
was open and never did succeed in speaking to a lawyer. 
Furthermore, the accused did not give any “indication 
V
Mmotor vehicle involved in an accident 
in which the other driver was killed 
and two passengers were seriously 
injured. The accused was convicted 
y a jury of one count of impaired driving causing death 
nd two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm. 
he accused appealed, in part, that the statements he 
ade to police were inadmissible because he did not 
ave an operating mind, the officer lacked reasonable 
rounds, and the accused’s right to counsel was 
reached. Furthermore, it was suggested the 
ertificate of analysis should be excluded.  
tatements to Police 
he accused had told the officer that he was the 
river at the time of the accident and that he had 
onsumed two beers. Although a witness testified the 
ccused was “shaken up”, the judge nonetheless found 
he statements represented an operating mind. 
nother witness had stated the accused appeared lucid 
nd the accused told the officer at the scene he was 
ine.  
that he had not contacted counsel nor that he required 
more time”. The certificate of analyses was admissible 
and it, by itself was strong evidence of impairment. At 
para. 9, the unanimous Alberta Court of Appeal stated: 
 
[I]t is clear that a breathalyser reading can itself be 
relied upon as evidence of impairment. Both experts 
testified that impairment occurs in all persons at blood-
alcohol levels in excess of 100 milligrams… 
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ca 
 
THREATENING CONVICTION 
DOES NOT BREACH FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION 
R. v.Taylor, 2002 BCSC 455 
 
The accused, who was involved in a 
olume 2 Issue 5 
ay 2002 bitter property and child custody 
dispute with the mother of his child, 
called and left a telephone message 
on the answering machine of a Real Estate Board. In 
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 the message, the accused used phrases such as “Now 
you can deal with this the easy way or the hard way, 
but nobody will ever be safe selling my property 
without my authority" and "So what you want to do is 
put a note not be sold or even shown. That would be 
inviting combat into their lives from the Airborne 
Brotherhood Security Forces of the Church of 
Freedom and Children First”. At trial, the Court found 
the messages created an “eerie and ominous tone” and 
were consistent with someone wanting to be taken 
seriously. The accused was convicted of uttering 
threats contrary to s.264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code 
but appealed to the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
arguing his Charter right to freedom of expression had 
been violated because the message was an “expression 
of his religious beliefs” and a statement of what he 
called the “terms of engagement”.  
 
The actus reus of threatening is the uttering of the 
threat while the mens rea is that the words uttered be 
taken seriously; there is no need for any further action 
beyond the threat itself. The trial judge had properly 
considered the elements of the offence and the 
freedom of expression guaranteed in the Charter 
“cannot apply so broadly as to protect the “right” to 
make statements that threaten others, contrary to the 
provisions of the Criminal Code”. The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
OFFICER’S OPINION NEED NOT 
BE FORMED ‘AS SOON AS 
PRACTICABLE’: IMPAIRED 
CONVICTION UPHELD 
R. v. Colbourne, 2002 BCSC 416 
 
A police officer pulled the 
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arrangements to tow the accused’s car to his hotel, the 
accused was transported to the police detachment 
where he contacted a lawyer and subsequently provided 
two breath samples of 120mg%.  
 
The accused appealed his conviction of driving while 
over 80mg% arguing, in part, that the officer’s demand 
to provide breath samples was not made “as soon as 
practicable”. The law requires that the Crown must 
“provide some evidentiary basis to establish that the 
demand was made as soon as practicable once the 
officer had formulated his opinion”, but it “does not 
say when the opinion must be formed”. Even though the 
officer agreed at trial that he had enough indicia of 
impairment to form his opinion before the sobriety 
tests were performed, it is not the opinion that must 
be formed as soon as practicable, but the demand that 
must be made as soon as practicable after the opinion 
is formed. Here, it was the officer’s ”practice to 
continue investigating…by doing sobriety tests and then 
making the demand”.  Taylor J. for the Supreme Court 
of British Columbia wrote: 
 
Such opinion must be made on "reasonable and probable 
grounds". To do so, there must be some investigation that 
provides that basis. To say that an officer had too much 
evidence or should have formed it at some earlier 
moment would, in my view, be an inappropriate 
retrospective assessment. A police officer should not, in 
my view, be criticized for the thoroughness of his 
investigation even though he may have had the basis to 
form such an opinion at an earlier stage of the 
investigation absent oblique motives for not forming the 
opinion earlier. 
 
The officer testified that before demanding a roadside 
screening device, it was his practice in investigating such 
offences to conduct three standardized field sobriety 
tests despite having observed the manner of driving and 
symptoms such as the blood-shot, watery eyes and smell 
of liquor on the driver's breath. 
 
It was after these tests that he said he formed his 
V
M 
accused over after observing a 
vehicle make a wide turn and stop 
about 100 feet from an 
intersection. The accused had 
lood-shot, watery eyes and an odour of liquor on his 
reath. Following the accused’s failure of sobriety 
ests, the officer demanded the accused submit to a 
oadside screening device which he also failed. As a 
esult, the officer formed the opinion the accused was 
mpaired, Chartered and warned him, and after about 
2 minutes in which the accused asked questions of the 
fficer, the breathalyzer demand was made. Following 
opinion to make the road side screening device demand at 
23:04 and then formed his opinion to demand that 
samples of the appellant's breath be given at 23:10 once 
that road side screening had occurred. There is no 
suggestion in the evidence nor is it alleged the officer 
had some reason to carry out these sobriety tests other 
than as a part of his investigation. 
 
And further: 
 
To have required the police officer, even though at 22:55 
he may have had reasonable and probable grounds, to 
cease his inquiries or investigation and form his opinion at 
olume 2 Issue 5 
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 that point as opposed to 23:10 when he had additional 
information would emasculate investigations. 
 
The starting point for the consideration of "as soon as 
practicable" is the forming of the opinion.  
 
In this case, the passage of time was clearly 
explained and the demand was made as soon as 
practicable. The appeal was dismissed and the 
conviction upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL ‘CLEAR, 
CORRECT, & INFORMATIVE’: 
APPEAL DISMISSED 
R. v. Wallace, 2002 NSCA 52 
 
Police officers, acting on a tip from 
police failed to properly inform him of the right to 
“free” counsel and how to access such legal services. 
Further, the accused testified he had taken more than 
the amount of medication he was prescribed to calm his 
nerves and half a can of beer. He suggested he did not 
understand anything the officer told him other than 
the demand for breath samples and did not know what 
“duty counsel” meant. He also asserted he did not call a 
lawyer because he would be charged for a long distance 
telephone call and had limited means, and no money. 
Finally, from his experience of being in police custody 
on prior occasions, he believed the police were 
obligated to contact a lawyer on his behalf.   
 
In rejecting the appeal, Saunders J.A. for the 
unanimous appeal Court found that what the officer 
told the accused at the time of the stop was “clear, 
correct, and informative”.  
 
[The officer] clearly informed [the accused] of both his 
a citizen that a vehicle was being 
driven erratically by a possible 
impaired driver, stopped the accused 
who exhibited the usual signs of 
impairment. The officer read the accused the breath 
demand followed by his right to counsel. The accused 
acknowledged understanding and indicated he wanted 
to call a lawyer. The accused was transported to the 
police detachment and while entering the building told 
the officer he was not going to take the breathalyzer 
test. The officer guided the accused into a room with a 
desk, chair, telephone, and two posted notices; one 
with names and numbers of private practice lawyers 
and the other with both after hour duty counsel and 
business hour Legal Aid offices. The officer asked the 
accused to take a seat and placed a telephone book on 
the desk. The accused, who was standing in the 
doorway but had not yet entered the room, told the 
officer he had changed his mind about talking to a 
lawyer and simply wanted to go home. The accused 
again told the officer he was not going to blow in the 
breathalyzer. After the officer explained the 
consequences of a refusal, the accused reiterated he 
was not going to comply with the demand. An 
appearance notice was issued and the accused was 
released into the care of a friend to take him home.  
 
The accused was convicted at trial of both impaired 
driving and refusing to provide a breath sample. He 
appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal arguing, 
among other grounds, that his right to counsel under 
s.10(b) of the Charter had been violated because the 
right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and 
advised him as to the available means of accessing 
immediate legal advice without charge. All this was 
properly explained to the [accused] when first detained 
by the police at the scene. Further, when asked if he 
understood, he indicated he did. Finally, when asked if he 
wished to call a lawyer, he said that he did. 
 
And further: 
 
In our view, the [accused] clearly and unequivocally 
waived his right to counsel when he explicitly informed 
the police on more than one occasion that he had changed 
his mind, would refuse to take the breathalyzer test and 
simply wanted to go home. 
 
The Court characterized the accused’s testimony that 
he was worried he could not afford the call as “hardly 
convincing”; he never communicated this concern to the 
police. In summary, the Court stated: 
 
The evidence fully supports the conclusion that the 
[accused] was properly informed of his right to counsel, 
and that he was given every opportunity to access 
counsel, that he understood his rights and how to 
exercise those rights on the afternoon in question, then 
changed his mind and waived his rights, choosing not to 
avail himself of that opportunity.  
 
The appeal was dismissed and the accused’s conviction 
upheld.  
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 IDENTIFICATION NOT 
PROVEN: ACCUSED ACQUITTED 
OF IMPAIRED DRIVING 
R. v. Jobson, 2002 BCPC 0129 
 
The accused was charged with care 
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In acquitting the accused, the judge noted that the 
driver’s licence did not have a photograph of its holder 
nor did the police ask the driver to confirm any of the 
details of the licence to ensure that was in fact whom 
they were dealing with. Without a picture on the 
licence or any confirmation of the licence details at the 
scene, the mere attendance in court in response to the 
promise to appear was insufficient to establish identity 
V
Mand control while impaired and over 
80mg% as a result of a police 
roadblock. After his apprehension 
on the street and transport to the 
olice detachment, a police officer took the accused to 
n interview room for the purpose of letting him make 
 telephone call. The accused could not recall the name 
f his lawyer so the officer called Legal Aid (to whom 
he accused spoke). The accused then remembered his 
awyer’s name, called his office, but received no 
esponse. The accused subsequently provided a sample 
f his breath.  
t trial, the accused argued that his s.10(b) Charter 
ight to counsel was violated because he was denied 
ounsel of his choice. In holding that the accused’s 
ight was not violated, Hogan J. stated: 
There's some case law that the police should be vigilant 
in assuring that the accused has his right to call counsel 
of his choice and that automatically phoning Legal Aid 
isn't enough to satisfy the Charter requirement. 
However, in this case the accused both spoke to Legal 
Aid and he did get to call counsel of his choice. It was his 
lawyer's absence from his office at midnight that left 
the accused without his counsel of choice. Having a 
lawyer who's not available is not having a lawyer. Well 
that's pretty obvious, but that's not the fault of the 
police or the Charter. The accused had opportunity to 
call and the police have extended him quite an effort to 
try and get him to counsel of his choice. So I honestly 
can't see how a lack of his lawyer's availability somehow 
escalates into a Charter problem for him. Perhaps he 
should consider suing his former lawyer for non-
availability at midnight. (emphasis added) 
 
he accused further argued that Crown was unable to 
rove the identification of the accused as the impaired 
river because the officers were unable to identify 
im in court. The Crown argued that the driver 
roduced a (non-picture) driver’s licence at the scene, 
as taken to the police station, issued a promise to 
ppear, and that the accused appeared in response to 
hat notice, plead not guilty, and now stands on trial. 
his circumstantial evidence, the Crown suggested, 
roved identity.  
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
ACCURATE PREDICTIONS OF 
INFORMANT SUPPORTS 
REASONABLE GROUNDS 
R. v. Kwong, 2002 BCPC 0132 
 
A police officer received 
olume 2 Issue 5 
ay 2002 confidential information from a 
source who had personally dealt with 
two heroin and cocaine dealers, one a 
5’6”, stocky Hispanic looking male in 
his mid 20’s named “Carlos or Chris” and the other a 20 
year old Chinese male named “Mike”, that they would 
drive a gold coloured Mazda protégé or a blue green 
Nissan Ultima in which they would sell drugs at a local 
McDonald’s restaurant. The drugs were concealed in 
the Mazda’s driver’s side door armrest or under the 
Nissan’s console near the gearshift. The source also 
provided the names of purchasers including Terry 
Edwards (a known heroin addict). The source told the 
officer that they would attend Terry Edward’s 
residence everyday between 12:15 pm and 1:00 pm. The 
officer did not have licence plate numbers for the 
vehicles nor did he take any steps to corroborate the 
information.  
 
The officer, along with other police members, set up 
surveillance in marked police vehicles surrounding the 
area of Terry Edwards’ residence. At 12:39 pm, the 
officer observed a person leave Edwards’ residence and 
run up the street. After the officer made a u-turn, he 
saw a late model brown gold or mustard colour Mazda 
Protégé with a driver and the male he saw running as 
the passenger. Although the officer did not see any 
movement inside the vehicle consistent with a drug 
transaction, the two appeared shocked to see the 
officer as evidenced by their facial expressions and 
body language. The driver was an Asian male in his early 
20’s.  
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 The accused was stopped by the officer, using area 
break and enters as a ruse, and produced a valid 
picture British Columbia driver’s licence. The accused 
told the officer that he was visiting a friend named 
Terry and offered to call him on the phone. Terry 
Edwards subsequently attended and advised the 
officer that the accused and his passenger were 
visiting him. At this time the accused was arrested for 
trafficking in drugs, provided his Charter right to 
counsel, cautioned regarding statements, and searched 
incidental to arrest. Police found the following items: 
 
• a large amount of money on the accused; 
• a cellular telephone in plain view in the vehicle; 
• a glasses case containing cocaine, another cellular 
telephone, and some money in the glove box; 
• a “score sheet” on the floor by the driver’s seat;  
• a “score sheet” in the pocket of the driver’s door; 
and  
• cocaine and heroin wrapped in plastic baggies 
underneath the pocket of the driver’s door. 
 
The accused argued that the search was unlawful 
because the officer lacked reasonable grounds to make 
the arrest. It was suggested there was no evidence 
concerning the reliability of the informant and officer 
acted “precipitously”. There was no detailed 
description of the Asian male, no licence plate was 
provided, no drug transaction was observed, and the 
only matching circumstances was the presence of a 
similar vehicle with an Asian male all of which could be 
“innocent coincidence”. Moreover, the accused asserted 
he was in a lawfully parked and fully licensed vehicle 
and apart from the tip there was no basis for the 
detention and arrest.  
 
The test for determining whether reasonable grounds 
exists is whether the officer had the requisite 
personal belief supported by objective evidence. When 
reasonable grounds finds a basis in an informants tip, 
the reliability of the information must be assessed by 
examining the totality of the circumstances with 
particular attention to: 
 
• whether the source was credible; 
• whether the information was compelling; and  
• whether the police were able to corroborate any 
part of the information. 
 
In this case there was no evidence of the credibility of 
the informant or any attempt to corroborate the 
information prior to the surveillance. However, many of 
the officer’s observations during the surveillance were 
accurately predicted by the source. The officer 
observed a similar vehicle described by the informant 
driven by an Asian male in his 20’s attend a street near 
a known drug user (Terry Edwards) as disclosed by the 
source during the time frame predicted. The officer 
then saw a person leave the known drug user’s house 
and enter the vehicle driven by the Asian male. The 
two occupants appeared shocked at the sight of the 
officer and were in possession of a cellular telephone, 
which is known to be used by drug dealers. After the 
accused was detained, the known drug user attended 
the scene after being summoned by the cellular 
telephone call made by the passenger. In finding the 
officer had the necessary reasonable grounds to 
arrest, Bruce J. stated: 
 
Viewing the circumstances in their entirety, it appears to 
me that the sequence of events actually observed by [the 
officer] conformed sufficiently to the anticipated 
pattern predicted by the tip to remove any possibility of 
innocent coincidence…. Further, the strength found in the 
compelling nature of the tip, as well as the amount of 
detail confirmed by the constable's observations prior to 
arrest, overcome the weakness in the evidence 
concerning the general credibility of the source and the 
lack of corroborative investigation. While it would have 
been preferable if the officers had conducted more 
surveillance prior to making a decision to arrest, the fact 
that they failed to do so does not render the arrest 
unlawful… 
 
Considering the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that [the officer] had 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused 
and search him and his vehicle incidental to arrest. In my 
view, a reasonable person placed in the position of the 
officer would have come to the same conclusion; that is, 
there was a reasonable probability that the accused was 
in possession of illegal drugs for the purpose of 
trafficking. (references omitted) 
 
The evidence was admissible. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“[P]olice work, can be and often is quite onerous. The hostility 
that the police face frequently in carrying out their duties is 
unpleasant even to the most thick-skinned among them. The 
constant possibility of danger and violence erupting in their 
work does little to provide a tension-free job environment. 
The sheer human ugliness that they are called upon to deal 
with in the course of one year on the force surpasses 
significantly the amount tolerated in the whole life span of 
most individuals6”. Rose Yunka, PhD. 
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6 (1977). Police Field Training: The Analysis of a Socialization Process. Washington 
University. 
 SAFETY ALERT 
 
A New York police officer reportedly located this 
rectal plug containing the following pictured items. 
 
 
UNLAWFUL ENTRY TO 
ARREST: RESIST CHARGE 
STAYED 
R. v. Borden, 2002 NSPC 3 
 
Police, acting on an arrest warrant, 
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a warrantless entry. Since the arrest was unlawful, the 
resist charge was stayed. However, the breach of 
probation and threatening charge remained since there 
was neither any evidence related to those charges that 
was obtained as a result of the Charter breach or any 
connection between the breach and the charges. 
 
REASONABLE BELIEF 
ESTABLISHED DESPITE USE 
OF UNCALIBRATED DEVICE 
R. v. Linford, 2002 ABPC 47 
 
After stopping the accused for 
speeding, an officer made a formal 
demand for a breath sample into a 
roadside screening device. The 
accused provided a sample that resulted in a “fail” 
reading. At this time, the officer formed the opinion 
that the accused’s ability to operate a motor vehicle 
was impaired by alcohol, arrested him, and read him his 
Charter rights. The accused acknowledged 
understanding and indicated he wished to contact a 
lawyer. The officer then cautioned the accused and 
read the breath demand. When asked if he understood, 
the accused replied “100%”.  
 
The accused was transported to the police station 
where he was placed in a phone room. He placed a call 
to a friend, presumably to obtain the number of a 
lawyer, and then made a second call that went 
unanswered. He then refused to make any more phone 
V
Mattended a mobile home where the 
accused was believed to be living. 
The police spoke to the accused’s 
common law spouse who denied that 
he accused was in the trailer. After hearing footsteps 
ithin the trailer, police entered and arrested the 
ccused. During the arrest, the accused resisted and 
hreatened the officers. In addition to the outstanding 
reach of probation charge, the accused was charged 
ith resisting arrest and uttering threats. 
he accused made an application seeking relief under 
.24 of the Charter to have the all the charges stayed 
ncluding the original breach of probation. Campbell J. 
ound that the police “knew or should have known” that 
he accused had a “limited expectation of privacy” 
hile resident in the trailer which was sufficient to 
equire a warrant to enter to effect the arrest. There 
ere no exigent circumstances such as flight or the 
estruction of evidence which might otherwise justify 
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ay 2002 calls. The officer re-explained the right to counsel and 
read a waiver. The accused acknowledged 
understanding of the waiver and after being asked if 
he wished to contact any lawyer he replied “no”. When 
asked, “Are you sure?”, he replied “Yah”. The accused 
was escorted from the phone room, and after doing 
some push ups, provided samples of his breath.  
 
The accused argued that the certificate of analysis 
was inadmissible because the officer used an 
uncalibrated roadside screening device to form his 
reasonable grounds and his s.10(b) rights were violated 
because the waiver advice he was given was deficient. 
 
The Roadside Screening Device 
 
The police policy required that all roadside screening 
devices be calibrated every two weeks; if not they 
were removed from use. Each device was affixed with a 
sticker, which would have the calibration expiry date. 
On this occasion, there was no sticker attached to 
15
 indicate the date of expiry, nor did the officer check 
the calibration log. The officer assumed that the 
persons responsible for calibrating the devices did so. 
At the trial, it was revealed that the device used by 
the officer was beyond the two-week calibration 
period. However, Patterson J. found that although the 
police policy required two week tests on the devices, 
there was no corresponding duty on the officer to 
ensure the check had taken place. The officer’s belief 
that the device was calibrated was, along with the 
“fail” reading, sufficient to provide reasonable and 
probable grounds for the breath demand.  
 
The s.10(b) Waiver 
 
When an arrestee originally expresses a desire to 
contact counsel and has been reasonably diligent in 
exercising it but changes their mind, the police must 
inform the person of: 
  • their the right to a reasonable opportunity to 
contact a lawyer, and  
• the police obligation in “holding off” from 
questioning or  other evidence gathering (including 
breath samples) until the opportunity is provided. 
 
In this case, the information read to the accused was 
deficient in that it failed to provide the advice that 
the police must “hold off” their investigation until he 
was provided a reasonable opportunity. However, this 
additional advice requirement is triggered only when 
the person asserts their right to counsel and has been 
reasonably diligent in exercising it. Here, the accused 
made two phone calls; one to a friend and the second 
went unanswered. The phone room contained lists of 
duty counsel and other lawyers posted on the walls and 
had he made a minimal effort to call, he would have 
likely received free, immediate advice. Having failed to 
establish that he was being reasonably diligent, the 
“holding off” component of the warning was not 
required. The accused failed to prove that his s.10(b) 
right had been violated and the certificate of analysis 
was admissible. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Citizens who are engaged in the policing profession are 
the guardians of life and property. While the public 
expects that ordinary citizens will run from 
circumstances of extreme danger, it is the heroic duty 
of a police officer to run toward that danger and 
resolve it. Police work often occurs in highly volatile 
circumstances that are not always viewed by the public. 
Because police are granted discretion in the exercise 
of their extraordinary powers, there is a recognized 
need for public accountability. That accountability 
should not, however, amount to simply second-
guessing7”. B.C.’s Deputy Police Complaint Commissioner 
Barb Murphy 
 
IN or OUT? MAKING THE 
CALL ON A s.8/24(2) CHARTER 
ANALYSIS 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
Section 24(2) of the Charter, 
although sometimes referred 
to as the “exclusionary rule”, 
does not require exclusion in 
all cases. This provision 
provides a remedy for the 
exclusion of evidence obtained through an infringement 
of a Charter right provided the requirements of the 
section are met: 
 
Although all relevant, probative evidence is prima facie 
admissible at trial, s.24(2) provides an aggrieved person 
with a mechanism to exclude evidence resulting from a 
Charter violation.   
 
In a s.8 Charter claim for relief under s. 24(2), the 
person who is seeking exclusion of evidence must satisfy 
the court on the balance of probabilities that their 
personal right to be secure against unreasonable search 
or seizure was violated. There is no obligation on the 
Crown to establish that the search and seizure did not 
violate s.88.  Although this onus is on the person seeking 
exclusion, they need not necessarily give evidence. In 
some cases a breach will be readily established on the 
                                                 
7 Testimony at the Special Committee To Review The Police Complaint Process, 
Wednesday, April 17, 2002 
8 R. v. Hammil (1984) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 338 (B.C.C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. 
dismissed [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.), also R. v. Feldman (1994) 91 C.C.C. (3d) 256 
(B.C.C.A.) per Hinkson J.A. leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed 93 C.C.C. (3d) 575 
(S.C.C.) 
s.24(2) Charter  
Where...a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a 
manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms 
guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if 
it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, 
the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.  
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 basis of evidence led by the Crown9. To establish that 
the evidence should be excluded as a result of a Charter 
violation under s.8 , the applicant must prove: 
 
¾ their personal s.8 right was violated. A third 
party may not bring an application for exclusion by 
claiming prejudice through the use of evidence 
gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure 
directed at another person. In proving their 
personal right was violated, a person must 
demonstrate the following three elements: 
 
• the search and/or seizure was conducted by 
a government agent (the police). The Charter 
controls state action, not the behaviour of 
persons in the private sphere10. However, 
private persons may be converted into actors of 
the state when they take an active role by 
performing a function at the direction of the 
police.   
 
• the person had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. The accused must show that their 
reasonable expectation of privacy was breached 
by the state conduct11. 
 
• the search was unreasonable. Simply 
demonstrating  that a warrantless search or 
seizure occurred satisfies this requirement. 
The police will then be required to rebut this 
presumption. Alternatively, the accused may 
choose to challenge the law, the manner of the 
search, or that police failed to comply with the 
substantive or procedural requirements of the 
authorizing law. 
 
¾ the evidence was obtained in a manner that 
violated their personal Charter right. It must be 
shown that the evidence in issue was obtained 
through a causal or temporal connection with the 
right violated. If the violation caused the obtaining 
of the evidence, the evidence will have been 
obtained in a manner that infringed or denied a 
Charter right. Alternatively, if there is a sufficient 
temporal nexus or link12 between the violation and 
the evidence (the Charter breach is an integral part 
of a single transaction) or if the Charter violation 
was an integral component in a series of 
investigative tactics which lead to the securing of 
the evidence13, the evidence will have been obtained 
in a manner that infringed or denied a Charter right. 
                                                 
                                                9 R. v. Butler (1995) 104 C.C.C. (3d) 198 (B.C.C.A.) leave to appeal to Supreme Court 
of Canada refused 105 C.C.C. (3d) vi.. 
10 R. v. Fitch (1994) 93 C.C.C. (3d) 185 (B.C.C.A.) at p.189. 
11 R. v. Belnavis (1996) 107 C.C.C. (3d) 195 (Ont.C.A.) at p.207. 
12 R. v. Evans (1994) 93 C.C.C. (3d) 130 (B.C.C.A.) per Rowles at p.166 
 
¾ the admission of the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. In 
assessing whether the admission of the evidence will 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute, a 
24(2) Charter analysis involves three steps: 
 
• trial fairness. A fair trial is a basic tenet of 
Canada’s legal system and any evidence causing 
an unfair trial would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute and warrants exclusion. 
 
• the seriousness of the Charter violation. 
Whether the violation was serious or technical 
will depend on the nature and circumstances of 
the Charter infringement. For example, when 
the object of an unreasonable search is a 
dwelling house, any violation of the Charter will 
be rendered all the more serious14.  
 
• the effect of the admission/exclusion of the 
evidence on the administration of justice 
 
In assessing whether evidence will be excluded, courts 
will proceed on a case-by-case basis in recognizing the 
fundamental importance of balancing a person’s right to 
privacy and society's interest in effective law 
enforcement. In determining whether the admission of 
the evidence would bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute, a Court will consider the following15: 
 
• the kind of evidence obtained; 
• the Charter right infringed; 
• the seriousness of the Charter violation ; 
• whether the violation was deliberate, willful, 
flagrant, or was it inadvertent or committed in good 
faith. Good faith is not confined to objectively 
reasonable good faith, but may also include the 
subjective good faith of the officer16; 
• whether the violation occurred in circumstances of 
urgency or necessity; 
• whether other investigative techniques were 
available; 
• whether the evidence would have been discovered in 
any event; 
• whether the offence is serious; 
• whether the evidence is essential to substantiate 
the charge; and 
• whether other remedies are available. 
 
13 R. v. Grant (1993) 84 C.C.C. 198 (S.C.C.) at p.198. 
14 R. v. Lamy (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d)  558 (Man.C.A.)  at p.570. 
15 R. v. Collins [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.) 
16 R. v. Moran (1987) 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont.C.A.) 225 at p.248. 
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 NO SEARCH, NO SEAT  
R. v. Schippanoski, 
(2002) Docket:C34488 (OntCA) 
 
The accused, a passenger in a 
vehicle, appealed his conviction after 
was suggested that had the stop not been made, the 
officers would not have developed their reasonable 
grounds leading to the arrest and the obtaining of 
evidence relied upon to support the charge.   
 
A detention will not be arbitrary if the officer has an 
articulable cause to detain and the detention is the police searched him before he 
was allowed to enter a police car. At 
trial, the judge found a breach of 
the accused’s s. 8 Charter right, but admitted the drug 
evidence because the breach was not serious since it 
would have been “foolhardy” to permit a civilian to 
enter a police car before searching them. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal set aside the accused’s convictions and 
entered acquittals. Unlike the trial judge, Ontario’s top 
Court found the seriousness of the breach favoured 
the exclusion of the evidence. The police unlawfully 
detained the accused outside for some time in freezing 
weather, did not have reasonable grounds for the 
search, the search was relatively intrusive, and there 
was an absence of good faith efforts to comply with 
the law. Although the objective of the police policy in 
searching civilians before they entered the police 
cruiser was reasonable, the officer did not implement 
the policy lawfully. The officer should have informed 
the accused that as a condition of entering the police 
car he would be searched, but had the right to refuse. 
If he refused, he simply would not be allowed to enter 
the car.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
DETENTION UNLAWFUL: 
EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Snape,  
[2002] O.J. No. 714 (OntSCJ) 
 
From previous experiences, police 
knew that drug and alcohol related 
justified in the circumstances. In this case, Ferguson 
J. held that the police lacked an articulable cause that 
the accused was engaged in activity that was criminal: 
 
First, the location is not one where the police had reason 
to believe all activity was criminal; for example, as in a 
crack house. This was a public park where a wide variety 
of legal activities occurred.  
 
Second, the facts related to the parking of the car and 
the time of day cannot support a conclusion that this was 
a situation which is more likely than not associated with 
illegal activity.  
 
Finally, … the police had no reason to suspect that the 
accused in particular, or the driver of the vehicle, was 
involved in criminal activity. There was no significant 
evidence relating to the occupant of the vehicle other 
than the place and time of day. 
 
Without articulable cause, the detention was arbitrary 
and a violation of s. 9 of the Charter. The police had 
the erroneous perception that they had the power to 
stop anyone who happened to be at a place where the 
police believed could be the site of ongoing criminal 
activity. Since the evidence the Crown sought to rely 
upon would not have been discovered without the 
Charter breach, the judge excluded the evidence as a 
remedy under s.24(2). 
 
SNAIL MAIL EXTENDS 30-
DAY TIME LIMIT BY 10 DAYS: 
DEEMED CONVICTION SET 
ASIDE activity took place in a park at night. 
Three officers, attending the park 
at dusk to investigate such activity, 
found a lone vehicle parked at the edge of the parking 
lot near some trees with its lights out. As the officers 
arrived, the vehicle began to reverse. Police stopped 
the vehicle by cutting off its exit and ordering the 
driver to stop. As a result of the stop, police found 
evidence which they sought to introduce at the 
accused’s trial. The accused argued that the detention 
was arbitrary and a breach of s. 9 of the Charter. It 
R. v. Tollstam, 2002 BCSC 556 
 
The accused was deemed convicted 
at the expiration of 30 days after 
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brought an application for an 
extension of time to appeal arguing 
that the 30-day time limit requires the dispute be 
deposited in the mail within 30 days, not that it be 
received within 30 days by the authorities.  After 
reviewing the applicable provisions of the Offence Act, 
19
 Hendersen J. found s. 15 of the Act made it clear that 
the ticket is deemed to be disputed on the day on 
which it is mailed.  Furthermore, in setting aside the 
deemed conviction, the Supreme Court Judge held that 
no deemed conviction should be entered on a violation 
ticket until at least 10 days after the expiry of the 30 
day period to account for the delivery of the mail.  
 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
ADP & REFUSAL CHARGE: 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
R. v. Frederickson, 2002 BCPC 0134 
 
A Provincial Court Judge stayed a 
charge of refusing to provide a 
breath sample after the accused 
had his 90-day administrative 
driving prohibition upheld. The 
accused had been charged with impaired driving and 
refusing to provide a breath sample under the Criminal 
Code. At the time, he was served with a 90-day driving 
prohibition under s.94.1 of the Motor Vehicle Act 
because he failed to comply with the Criminal Code 
breath demand. The accused sought a review of the 
prohibition, which was upheld by the adjudicator.   
 
The accused successfully argued that if the Criminal 
Code refusal charge were now to proceed, a double 
jeopardy situation would arise because the accused had 
already been subject to a quasi-criminal/quasi-judicial 
hearing (the s.94.1 MVA adjudication) and the facts in 
support of the Crown’s prosecution on the refusal are 
those that resulted in the 90-day prohibition. In 
staying the Criminal Code refusal charge, Saunderson 
J. stated, at para. 16: 
 
The essence of what occurred under the Motor Vehicle 
Act is that the Crown succeeded in having the defendant 
punished by a competent tribunal for failing to comply 
with a demand under section 254 of the Criminal Code. 
The Crown cannot now be heard to ask for another 
chance to punish the defendant on the same facts with, I 
might add, significantly greater penalties than have 
already been suffered by the defendant. To permit such 
an attempt would offend a principle fundamental to the 
common law. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
 
ABBOTSFORD POLICE 
10K CHALLENGE/5K FUN RUN 
SEPTEMBER 28, 2002 
 
The Abbotsford 
Police are once again 
gearing up for the 
Fraser Valley's 
premier running 
event. The 12th 
annual charity run in 
support of Special Olympics will be starting at 9:00 am 
on September 28, 2002 with a warm up by the Apollo 
Athletic Club between 8:35 and 8:45 am.. Walkers, 
runners, and strollers are welcome to attend. Last year 
there were 1200 participants and $30,000 was raised 
for Special Olympics, which is the largest amount ever 
in the history of the event! Group incentives are 
offered and awards will be given to the overall top male 
and female runners for each race along with medals to 
the top performers in each age category. Last years 
best time for the 5K was 17:11 while the top finisher in 
the 10K crossed the line in a time of 32:27.  
  
Entry fees are $20 for an adult (without a t-shirt), 
$28 for an adult (with a t-shirt) and $13 for a student 
(grade 12 and under) which also includes a t-shirt. If 
you register before July 31, 2002 you save $3. Late 
fees will apply for entries after September 15th. There 
are $10,000 in prizes to be won and food and 
refreshments will be provided at the finish line. All 
proceeds go to the Special Olympics!!! 
 
All the race details and 
registration information about 
the run are available by 
navigating the Abbotsford Police 
website at 
www.abbotsfordpolice.org and 
clicking on the 2002 Abbotsford 
Police 10K Challenge link or    
logging on directly to the 
www.abbotsfordpolice.org/sports/t
We hope to see you there!!! 
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